TOWARD EXASCALE RESILIENCE

Franck Cappello¹
Al Geist²
Bill Gropp³
Laxmikant Kale³
Bill Kramer⁴
Marc Snir³

Abstract

Over the past few years resilience has become a major issue for high-performance computing (HPC) systems, in particular in the perspective of large petascale systems and future exascale systems. These systems will typically gather from half a million to several millions of central processing unit (CPU) cores running up to a billion threads. From the current knowledge and observations of existing large systems, it is anticipated that exascale systems will experience various kinds of faults many times per day. It is also anticipated that the current approach for resilience, which relies on automatic or application level checkpoint/restart, will not work because the time for checkpointing and restarting will exceed the mean time to failure of a full system. This set of projections leaves the community of fault tolerance for HPC systems with a difficult challenge: finding new approaches, which are possibly radically disruptive, to run applications until their normal termination, despite the essentially unstable nature of exascale systems. Yet, the community has only five to six years to solve the problem. This white paper synthesizes the motivations, observations and research issues considered as determinant of several complimentary experts of HPC in applications, programming models, distributed systems and system management.

Key words: exascale, challenge, resilience, fault tolerance, high-performance computing.

1 From Fault Tolerance to Resilience

Essentially, users of high-performance computing (HPC) systems want to be able to submit long-running jobs and have them run to completion in a timely manner. This demand is even more stringent for users of top-level supercomputers, because these systems are acquired to run jobs that cannot complete in a timely manner on smaller systems. However, several obstacles make this demand difficult to achieve even for today’s supercomputers. Because of their scale and complexity, current supercomputers have frequent failures and can run for only a few days before some part of the system requires rebooting. While techniques for fault tolerance and continuous and tightly-coupled operation exist and are used in some specialized systems, these techniques have not been scaled to the level required for supercomputing and are extremely expensive. The cheaper alternative of maintaining a safe state on stable disk storage does not work well for large, tightly-coupled applications and results in the loss of a significant amount of computed work whenever a failure occurs.

The current response to faults in existing systems consists in restarting the execution of the application and the pieces of its software (SW) environment that have been affected by faults. To avoid restarting from the beginning, users may checkpoint the execution of their applications periodically and restart them from a safe checkpoint after faults have occurred. Note that in some situations, several pieces of the SW environment have to be restarted as well. However, checkpointing and restarting has a cost: it takes time and energy. Some projections estimate that, with the current technique, the time to checkpoint and restart may exceed the mean time to interrupt of top supercomputers before 2015. This not only means that a computation will make little progress; it also means that fault-handling protocols have to handle multiple errors – current solutions are often designed to handle single errors. Moreover, the current approach for fault tolerance is to apply the same technique (checkpoint/restart) to all types of faults (permanent node crash, detected transient errors, network errors and file system failures) and for the whole duration of the execution. However, not all faults require the general and expensive checkpoint/restart approach. As an example, detected transient hardware (HW) faults (soft

¹ INRIA, LABORATOIRE EN RECHERCHE INFORMATIQUE, FRANCE.
(CAPPELLO@ILLINOIS.EDU)
² OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, TN, USA.
³ DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN, USA.
⁴ NERSC, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY, IL, USA.
If we observe the situation more closely, we see that none of the higher layers of the SW stack have been specifically designed to cope with faults. Only a few SW components, such as some message-passing interface (MPI) libraries, have been partially retrofitted to tolerate some faults. Moreover, there is no communication and coordination between SW layers and SW components within every layer for fault detection and management. An example of this lack is the MPI environment itself; even if some MPI libraries have been adapted to tolerate failures, their associated runtime environment is not fault tolerant, and requires a restart from scratch at every fault. Another example is the lack of coordination regarding fault detection and management between an application and the libraries used by the application. As a consequence, even if applications themselves were designed to resist faults, most parts of their SW environment would not let the execution survive the faults.

Since exascale supercomputers, which are expected by 2018, will exhibit greater complexity and many more faults than today’s supercomputers, one can gauge the challenge that the community in HPC is facing; it is not only adapting or optimizing well-known and proven techniques, but it is also making the full SW stack fault tolerant and/or fault aware and ensuring that fault detection and management is consistent across the whole SW stack. The problem of building reliable systems out of unreliable components did preoccupy the first generation of computing system designers – see, e.g., Von Neuman, 1956, as first generation computers were very failure prone. The succeeding generations of system designers did succeed in building fairly reliable systems; application visible faults became rare events so that all faults could be treated in the same way. The inherent instability of exascale systems, the envisioned diversity of their faults and the limitations of generic “one fits all” fault tolerance approaches will force the community to reconsider the fault tolerance problem as a whole, develop resilient SW and provide a set of dedicated solutions in addition to (or instead of) a general purpose one.

2 A Rapid Tour of Existing Technologies and Open Issues at Petascale

All current production quality technologies for fault tolerance in HPC systems and applications are designed for fail stop errors (node, operating system (OS) or process crash, network disconnections, etc.) and rely on the classic checkpoint/restart approach (automatic or application level) Most of the solutions focus on applications using MPI, albeit there are some exceptions, such as for Charm++. Almost all store the application state on remote storage, generally a parallel file system, through I/O nodes. Two recent exceptions are the Charm++, in a memory-distributed checkpoint scheme, and the Scalable Checkpoint/Restart (SCR) library used at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) that tolerates a single node failure following the diskless checkpointing approach.

Existing technologies for checkpointing include Berkeley Lab Checkpoint/Restart (BLCR) (at the OS level) (BLCR, 2009), the application level checkpointing environment, the SCR library (SCR, 2009) developed at Livermore, the Cornell Checkpoint pre-Compiler (C3) (Bronlevetsky et al. 2003) and virtual machine checkpointing with XEN (http://www.xen.org). Other SW environments have been used in the past but are no longer used in large centers: Libckpt (OS level improved by programmer annotations) (Libckpt, 2009) and the Condor stand alone checkpoint library (OS level) (CSCL, 2009). The current most popular environment (BLCR) does not provide incremental checkpointing (at the time we are writing this article) and does not provide annotations that would allow the programmer a fine control of the checkpoint process. In addition to these non-commercial technologies, some vendors, such as IBM and SUN, have developed their own sophisticated checkpoint/restart technologies.

At the parallel computer level, fault tolerant environments mostly concern the MPI. Several environments have been designed or adapted to make MPI applications fault tolerant: fault-tolerant message passing interface (FTMPI) (FT-MPI, 2009), Open MPI (OpenMPI, 2009), MPICH-V (Bosilca et al.2002), local area multicomputer message-passing interface (LAM-MPI) (LAM/MPI, 2009), MPVAPICH (MVAPICH, 2009), Los Alamos message passing interface (LA-MPI and AMPI) (Bosilca et al. 2002), local area multicomputer message-passing interface (LAM-MPI) (Indiana) (LAM/MPI, 2009), MPVAPICH (Ohio) (MVAPICH, 2009), Los Alamos message passing interface (LA-MPI) (Los Alamos) and adaptive message-passing interface (AMP) (UIUC). These environments differ in the type of faults they are managing, their design, fault-tolerance approach and the fault-tolerance protocol they are using. Other environments, such as Charm++, provide fault-tolerance features. On the other hand, none of the partitioned global address space (PGAS) environments are fault tolerant. Addressing this lack can be considered as an important priority.

Since, in the past, most of the development efforts on fault tolerance have been addressing fail stop errors with classic checkpoint/restart, many issues remain open concerning the management of other types of faults and other fault tolerance approaches that have not been studied in
enough depth. As a matter of fact, many fundamental parameters of fault tolerance for HPC systems and parallel applications are not well understood. In the following paragraphs we give five examples of problems requiring more research even at the petascale.

The first example is related to remote access system Reliability, Availability, Serviceability (RAS) analysis. Several analyses have been made concerning the root cause behind failures (Lu, 2005; Oliner and Stearley, 2007; Schroeder and Gibson, 2007). The three most recent publications in this domain reach contradictory conclusions concerning the respective responsibility of SW and HW. This is not really surprising since these three studies analyze three different sets of systems in three different locations. This limited comprehension of root causes makes fault-effect avoidance (the capability to avoid the effects of faults) difficult. Without a good understanding of root causes, it seems illusory to design and validate fault-prediction mechanisms. Without a good fault-prediction system, research on proactive actions is almost useless. In addition, even if at some point we are capable of predicting accurately errors, we still have to find: (1) acceptable solutions to handle false negatives and (2) how to handle predicted SW errors (process or virtual machine migration is not a response for SW errors).

Another example is “silent errors”. Silent errors are simply faults that never get detected, or get detected long after they have generated erroneous results. They can be transient as in the case of HW soft errors. Transient flipping of bits happens continuously in the memory of the largest systems in the world, but error correction code (ECC) memory automatically detects and corrects these faults. Silent HW errors arise when any part of the memory is not protected by ECC, in data paths, processor registers or units that are not protected, or when multiple memory faults cancel each other out preventing the detection of the faults. Silent errors are not limited to transient effects; one can have permanent undetected HW faults that are silent. Often they are only discovered when an application running on this HW gives a clearly wrong answer, fails to complete, or completes much more slowly than usual. By then it may be too late for the application to recover. Silent errors are not limited to HW faults. There have been several cases where SW or firmware code has had bugs in it that only manifest in rare cases, for example, router-chip SW that changes the bits in one message out of every billion. The key characteristic of silent errors is that they are undetected; therefore, there is no opportunity for an application to adapt or recover from the fault at the moment when it hits the system. If the rate of silent errors is too high, then a user must worry that the results of his simulation are incorrect. Designing mechanisms to tolerate silent errors depend on a better comprehension of these errors. Very few results are available about the quantitative evaluation of their likelihood on a large-scale during execution.

While large parallel computers often have HW mechanisms for fault detection in specific subsystems (e.g. the interconnection network), they do not usually provide an integrated approach that ensures fault tolerance at the system level. The problem is compounded by the use of commodity components designed for cost-sensitive applications that may tolerate high failure rates and frequent silent errors (e.g. gaming). Modern data centers (such as at Google) are designed to be resilient in order to provide continuous service; such a design is facilitated by the nature of the workloads they support (embarrassingly parallel, or very coarse grain). Parallel computers (whatever their size) by the nature of their workloads (fine grain parallelism) make such a design harder. However, there are many opportunities of HW supports with solid state drive (SSD) devices, specific networks, Transactional Memory, HW diagnostics, fault detectors, etc. There is a need to understand what kind of HW could be added and how to integrate it in the systems with reasonable cost and energy consumption.

We have already mentioned the lack of coordination between SW layers with regards to errors and fault management. Currently, when a SW layer or component detects a fault it does not inform the other parts of the SW running on the system in a consistent manner. As a consequence, fault-handling actions taken by this SW component are hidden to the rest of the system. Imagine that two SW components detect faults with the same root cause; they may take contradictory actions because of this lack of coordination. Likewise, if a SW layer detects an erroneous condition, it often has insufficient or incorrect information to determine the best response. In an ideal word, if a SW component detects a potential error, then the information should propagate to other components that may be affected by the error or that control resources that may be responsible for the error. Some SW components may also contribute to the decision making process, deciding on a plan for recovery, reconfiguration or adaptation. All SW components should then conform to this decision and take corresponding actions. There is already an attempt to develop a coordination system for SW called coordinated and improved fault tolerance (CIFT) (CIFT, 2009). However, few components are available and there is certainly a need to put more efforts into that topic.

One suggested way to cope with silent errors and a continuous stream of faults is to design fault-oblivious algorithms. These algorithms should demonstrate resilience and correctness in the face of faults (Engelman and Geist, 2005). Very little is known today about how to create such algorithms, except in the simplest cases that are nearly embarrassingly parallel or for problems that have simple checkers (Blum and Kannan, 1995). An example of questions that should be answered is the following: to what
extent are existing numerical methods, such as asynchronous iterative methods and chaotic relaxation approaches, resistant to information losses due to communication corruption, temporary disconnection, transient HW failures or damaged SW presenting a Byzantine behavior? Addressing this challenge does not rely only on application developers; the system SW also needs to cope with a continuous stream of faults and being in a constant state of reconfiguration of the system.

As discussed in the previous section, the fault-tolerance approaches used in production are supposed to be generic, managing all fault cases in the same global way whatever are the faults, the application and the execution phase within the application. Adaptive data protection may help to provide a more efficient approach by allowing specific responses according to the fault context. For example, not all data need to be saved at every checkpoint. This observation is the root of the “memory exclusion” mechanism proposed by Plank et al. (1999). Advanced techniques such as “compiler-assisted memory exclusion” help programmers to identify explicitly, in the code of the application, the data to be removed from the checkpoint. Another observation is that the current procedure for checkpoint/restart, which essentially relies on copying useful memory content and storing it on a stable storage (and vice versa for restart), may not be the most efficient/rapid way of saving and reconstructing the data. Programmers are in the best position to know how to save and restore quickly the critical data of their application, but they cannot use such adaptive data protection other than by doing it manually. More generally, there is a need to investigate the notion of “correctness models”. The programmer may provide information, in the program annotations, about ways to protect or check key data, computations or communications. The programmer may provide assertions that help improve anomaly detection. The system may use such annotations and assertions adaptively. This is similar to adaptive resource management in a run-time system: The programmer annotates the program to provide information on its properties; the run-time uses this information, and information on the state of the system, to allocate resources. One can think of this as a “fault-tolerance” budget that is managed by a “fault-tolerance manager”, based on information on the computation provided by the user, and information on the system, collected from various sensors.

3 Issues in Exascale Systems

There is a broad consensus in the community about the fact that exascale systems will be hit by errors/faults much more frequently than petascale systems. There are two main reasons behind this belief: (1) an exascale system will be composed of many more components than petascale systems and (2) the mean time to failure (MTTF) of each of these components will not improve enough to compensate for (1).

Current projections of exascale systems are considering that a single supercomputer of this category will feature millions of central processing unit (CPU) cores and may have to run up to a billion threads. If we look to the past ten years, the performance increase of the best supercomputers in the Top500 resulted from an increase in CPU clock frequency, an increase in the number of transistors per chip and an increase in the number of sockets in a machine. Clock frequency has flattened in the last few years, so that the increase in the number of sockets can be expected to accelerate. As a consequence, the number of components in an exascale system will be much higher than that of petascale systems (100,000 is the order of magnitude of the number of sockets we may see in exascale systems). The reliability of individual components is not likely to improve significantly in the near future. Indeed, the reliability of the components in HPC systems has not improved and may have degraded in the last 10 years. There are several reasons behind this observation: (1) the complexity and sensitivity of components get higher over time (more transistors, smaller transistors, lower voltage, more manufacturing variance); (2) manufacturers increase HW redundancy and error checking in their component to compensate for (1); (3) manufacturers are targeting a fixed-reliability level for components as most sold computers consist of one or few complex components and, as the lifetime of computing systems is measured in years, there is no meaningful market incentive to increase component reliability. With more components of similar reliability, exascale systems will experience more errors-faults-failures than petascale systems.

Even if there is not yet a consensus on this aspect, there is a suspicion that SW errors will dominate in exascale systems. The rationale behind this belief is that (1) the SW stack run on every node of a parallel computer is already very complex (current estimations of the number of code lines in such SW is several millions) and (2) this SW stack has not been designed or tested with high availability and resilience in mind. As a consequence most of the SW parts: (a) are not restartable or replaceable without impacting the other SW parts, (b) do not integrate enough fault-error detectors, and (c) have not been tested, validated or formally verified at the (much more expensive) level used for critical SW.

The community has translated these projections and suspicions into the following statement: faults/errors/failures will not be rare events anymore and should be considered as normal events. In other words, exascale systems will need to resist a continuous stream of faults/errors/failures.

The community, based on its past experiences and the observations of the current largest systems, envisions the following major issues:
1. Some faults will not be detected (silent errors). Both HW and SW silent errors are likely to happen.
2. Detected but uncorrectable transient errors may represent a large fraction of errors. The assumption is that with the increase of the integration level, the phenomena causing transient errors will have a much wider impact on the affected components, despite the redundancy mechanisms added by the manufacturers.
3. Correctable errors will increase the HW jitter due to the background error recovery activities (e.g. memory scrubbing and error handling), which will become significant.
4. Long-running jobs may be hit by HW and SW faults (of multiple types) several times before completion.
5. Current designs and practices of global, synchronized checkpoint/restart (on remote file systems) will not work anymore.

The community concurs that research for more reliability and robustness is critical at every layer between the hardware and the end user. Considering the existing technologies, the state of the art in research and the forecasted faults/errors characteristics of exascale systems, new resilience paradigms are required.

4 First Set of Recommendations: Improving/Facilitating Exchanges and Sharing in the Community

The resilience topic has several characteristics that distinguish it from the other research topics related to exascale systems with regards to the involved community.

Firstly, the community is very large and involves: (A) computer scientists whose main field is fault tolerance and resilience, (B) computer scientists whose main field is in other domains, but with some experience or specific knowledge on fault tolerance and resilience (people working on programming models, file systems, libraries, etc.), (C) application developers, (D) researchers and developers in numerical algorithms, (E) system managers and experts in HPC centers, (F) users of large-scale long-running applications and (G) SW and HW vendors.

Secondly, the community is spread all over the world but not organized at the international level. The skills of top-level research teams are mostly complementary; however, there are some overlaps, such as in the domains of fault-tolerant MPIs or event log analysis. An important observation is that no single team contains all the required skills to address the critical resilience issues listed in the following paragraphs.

All the participants of the HPC domain involved in resilience come with their own culture and perception of faults, errors, failures, their origins and consequences. The research methodology is not well established and shared across the HPC community. Simple examples are: (1) the lack of common metrics and benchmarks to stress fault tolerance or resilience approaches, (2) the lack of standardization and common structure for event logging and analysis and (3) the lack of an experimental environment.

As one can imagine, event logs are very important sources of information to understand the root cause behind failures. However, there is no existing standard on how system managers enter events in the logs that have not been reported by the automatic detection systems and automated systems do not follow standard formats. Moreover, it happens that the human-entered information is not consistent with that generated by the automatic detection systems. This raises significant difficulties when event logs have to be filtered, analyzed and mined to determine root causes.

Another remarkable element, which is a good example of problems raised when the coordination is weak, is the lack of common definition on some critical issues. Take as an example the definition of “soft errors”. This term is becoming widely used to express the kind of faults that are expected to be prevalent (or at least very frequent) in exascale systems. The definition of this term varies. In some communities “soft errors” means transient physical faults, while in the general definition, published in one reference paper on dependability, “errors produced by intermittent faults are usually termed soft errors” and “elusive development faults and transient physical faults lead to both classes being grouped together as intermittent faults.” (Avizienis et al. 2004). The last definition clearly mentions SW as a potential source of “soft errors”, which is not the case for the former definition. “Examples are memory bloating and leaking, unterminated threads, unreleased file-locks, data corruption, storage space fragmentation, and accumulation of round-off errors” (Avizienis et al. 2004). Obviously, sharing common definitions on key issues is essential as a very first step of community coordination.

The notion of intermittent or transient errors itself is not well established in the HPC domain. Obviously transient or intermittent errors may be managed in different ways than permanent errors. What are the existing criteria and procedures to qualify an error in HPC systems as intermittent or transient? Who is responsible for making this distinction: the system manager or some algorithms analyzing the event logs? The answers to these questions are still open in our community and far from being shared.

As a consequence, there is a need for more exchanges and sharing between the members of the resilience community at the international scale.
5 Research Issues Considered as Important

The community has identified four main research topics considered as determinant to ensure the correct termination of parallel executions on exascale systems:

1. Fault detection, propagation and understanding.
2. Fault recovery.
3. Fault-oblivious algorithms.
4. Stress testing proposed fault-tolerance solutions.

5.1 Fault Detection and Understanding

Fault detection and understanding covers three sub-problems: improving fault detection and layer coordination, understanding faults and silent errors and improving situational awareness.

5.1.1 Fault Detection and Layer Coordination

There are only a few ways to deal with undetected faults (silent errors): (1) ignore them, assuming that they will stay marginal and that they will not degrade the result quality to an unacceptable level, (2) develop fault-oblivious algorithms that can resist by construction to a high level of undetected errors, (3) use some form of redundancy and online checking or (4) store, transfer and compute on an encoded version of the data (such as with the algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) technique). The first is unacceptable as undetected faults are too frequent. The second will require years, if not decades, of efforts to transform existing algorithms and methods to resilient versions resistant to a large variety of faults and errors. The third is feared to be too expensive in terms of overhead. The fourth is currently mostly limited to linear algebra operations. Thus, considering the risk of not managing undetected errors and the cost for their management, the community considers that more SW and HW detectors should be integrated in HPC systems to reduce the occurrence of undetected errors.

Not only should more errors be detected, but also a higher error-detection resolution should be used to determine initial/likely SW component failure, for both system-wide and non-system-wide SW caused failures.

As discussed in previous sections, there is a need to coordinate fault-error detection, propagation and management across the SW layers. To progress toward this objective, there is an immediate need to improve the propagation of error conditions through SW layers and HW components. At National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center (NERSC), about a year was spent trying to get correct error encodings coming up through the SW layers for a recent HPC system (Kramer, 2008). Efforts for correct propagation were required in almost every SW layer.

5.1.2 Understanding Faults and Silent Errors

Detecting errors/faults is a necessary objective to trigger fault-tolerance mechanisms and let them implement corrections. Of equal importance are the finding of the root causes and the analysis of the causalities chain that provoked the detected errors. Finding root causes helps to apply specific corrections in order to avoid future occurrences of the error. Since we envision that SW will be responsible for a large fraction of the errors, there is a need for a better analysis of root cause behaviors across
SW errors. For example, we need to verify if the informal root cause analysis in some bug reports that indicate a large portion of SW errors are caused by SW that is in error recovery or exception handling that is in itself correct. Analyzing the causality chain helps to understand how to stop the “contamination” of a root error by the introduction of confinement mechanisms. Several researches have been conducted on this topic. However, log analysis is still a very complex issue for several reasons: lack of standardization, lack of consistence in the log files and lack of research in log analysis engines.

The Petascale System Integration Workshop (Kramer et al. 2007), organized a couple of years ago, has already identified the format standardization for all logs as important. Another important objective would be a standard for error encoding. Obviously, standardization is fundamental to efficient log analysis of log files coming from different sources and also to limit the development effort and concentrate most of it on the analysis engine and not on translators. The consistent integration between human-entered event logging and automated information is regarded as another significant issue. When analyzing the error logs for five years at NERSC, it took about a person year to make all the operational and repair logs consistent with the automated log (PDSI, 2009). Whatever the standardization level and the consistency of the logs, the challenge is to create the analysis engines. Finding root causes requires browsing huge amounts of information and using filters to detect redundancies. Several recent papers have presented analysis results for different supercomputers. Since their conclusions are significantly diverging, it is important to understand the sources of this variation. Clearly, there is a need for greater efforts and collaborations in this domain. The data-mining community could probably help in this research.

Despite the existing error-detection system, some errors are not detected and reported. These silent errors are not well understood in their source, consequences and quantification. Silent errors are suspected and observed by their effects, for example when an application gives results considered as too divergent from the expected ones, fails to complete without detected errors or completes much more slowly than usual. Designing mechanisms to tolerate these errors depends on a better comprehension of the errors, especially when they come from the HW. However, we are not aware of any quantitative evaluation of their likelihood on a large scale during the application executions. The question here is: do we really need to develop specific mechanisms for these errors if they only affect a very small fraction of the executions? To give an answer to this question there is a need to determine if existing error occurrence models are enough to estimate quantitatively the likelihood of these errors for exascale systems. If the models are not accurate enough, we will need to use or create measurement platforms.

Understanding the sensitivity of HPC usage scenarios, applications and algorithms to faults, errors and failures is as important as understanding the errors and their root causes. In the HPC context the impact of faults and errors could be a significant slowdown of the application, a crash or an incorrect result. If the fault-tolerance mechanism reacts to faults and errors without considering the context of the execution, the result could be undesirable. For example, it was observed that some systems spend so much time in error recovery that performance becomes unpredictable. As a matter of fact, the impact of a failure in HPC applications varies and how to recover from errors depends on the context. Some HPC users launch large sets of small- or medium-scale simulations following a parameter sweep-like method. If one of the simulations fails, the user can decide whether or not it is worthwhile re-launching it. In this scenario, the consequence of a failure is less catastrophic than in a scenario where a single large simulation crashes or gives an incorrect result after tens of hours of execution. Some applications written following the master–worker paradigm do not need, in theory, to be fully restarted if an error or a fault happens in one worker node: only the failed process(es) have to be re-launched. Some algorithms based on chaotic relaxation seem to present good resilience qualities and can tolerate a certain amount of information loss, although these algorithms may not perform as well as less resilient ones. In a distributed system, the self-stabilizing algorithms can follow a forward recovery approach that can even tolerate Byzantine attacks. Such algorithms do not need an “external” correction of the errors to return eventually to a correct state. Thus, the response to a failure or an error depends on the context and the specific sensitivity to faults of the usage scenarios, applications and algorithms. However, even if this dependency on the context seems clear, there is no existing study evaluating this sensitivity and the minimal response for a large variety of scenarios, applications and algorithms.

In particular, little is known about the sensitivity of the algorithms to silent errors. A study published in SC 2004 could be a good starting point (Lu and Reed, 2004). Using SW fault injection in a non-protected HW (memory without ECC, no protocol checksum on communications, etc.), the authors have simulated single-bit memory errors, register file upsets and MPI message payload corruption and measured the consequences for a suite of MPI applications. These experiments showed that most applications are very sensitive to even single errors. The errors were often undetected (thus silent), leading to incorrect outputs. This study needs to be continued and expanded because it considered only three applications at a small scale (less than 200 processes) and only silent
HW faults. Going further in this direction, there is a need to understand the fundamental origin of the algorithm sensitivity to silent errors.

5.1.3 Situational Awareness In some cases, a major error is reported too late to the system manager for corrective actions, despite the fact that several minor errors have occurred and could have been reported. The problem comes from the automatic systems that silently correct some errors. An example is disk controllers that are very good at correcting errors and rebuilding data. However, disk controllers rarely inform the system manager about error detection and repair. In some situations, the repetition of minor errors eventually leads to major defects that controllers cannot fix. The system manager is then informed, but too late to take corrective action, such as replacing the failing device.

Situational awareness\(^7\) supposes excellent filtering systems that warn the system manager only about relevant issues, but provide sufficient information in a timely manner for the system manger to take appropriate action. Situation awareness (SA) is not a new problem for domains such as air traffic control, power plant operations, emergency response, military command and control and medicine. This is a major concern in these domains and many efforts have been devoted to studying what information is needed by human managers so, when automated systems fail, humans can step in and make effective judgments. There is a need to investigate this area more and probably learning from lessons in the mentioned domains using situational awareness.

5.2 Fault Recovery

5.2.1 Non-masking Approaches The principle of non-masking approaches is to report faults and errors to the applications or the users and let them: (a) decide on which strategy to adopt according to the faults and errors and have the runtime environment or the OS manage the recovery process (FT-MPI) or (b) actually organize most of the recovery process with minimal or no intervention of the runtime environment or the OS (application level checkpoint/restart and ABFT).

The non-masking approach was the original one for most applications and users. Most large-scale, long-lasting applications have some dedicated portion of the code devoted to checkpoint and restart. Checkpoint/restart in these codes has several objectives: it can be used to debug the application, to pause its execution to release the computing resources to other applications and for fault tolerance. In such applications, the code is not directly managing all aspects of fault tolerance. In particular, there is generally no mechanism for fault detection. When the environment (the batch system for example) reports a failure (generally the crash of the application), the user is informed and has the option to resubmit the application asking to restart its execution from the latest valid checkpoint. Saving the state of the application is the responsibility of the programmer who has to: (1) decide what data to save on a stable storage (local disk or remote file system), (2) make sure that the states of all participating processes are consistent before saving the data and (3) rearrange the application code to make the application restartable from the saved data. An application-level checkpoint/restart library can help the application programmer.

Application level checkpoint/restart has several known limitations that have not been really quantified by a thorough analysis. Firstly, since the programmer puts the checkpoint code directly into the application, there is no easy way to externally control the checkpoint interval. Indeed, without external control, the checkpoint interval depends directly on the performance of the processor and not on its estimated reliability. There is a way to alleviate this issue, under some conditions, by intercepting the checkpoint requests made by the application and have a control environment deciding whether or not to checkpoint. The second problem is the size of the checkpoint generated by this approach. It is suspected that the programmers save more data than needed because they cannot always easily track the modifications of the data structures between consecutive checkpoints. However, too few quantitative results are available on the overhead caused by a non-optimal checkpoint interval and on the size of the data saved during the application that is not required for restart. Furthermore, many third-party SW packages do not have checkpoint/restart options. An in-depth study of this approach would help understanding of its real limits.

One promising non-masking approach is ABFT (Huang and Abraham, 1984). It is classified as a non-masking approach because the programmers are required to adapt their algorithms to integrate ABFT. The ABFT approach consists of computing on data encoded with some level of redundancy. If an error or a fault occurs during the computation and if the encoded results have enough redundancy, it remains possible to reconstruct the missing part of the result. ABFT was proposed for systolic arrays. It is based on a mathematical property of the algorithm: the decoded results correspond to the algorithm applied on the non-encoded input parameters. In other words, the coded result stays consistent with the encoded input parameters thanks to the consistence preservation property of the algorithm. ABFT has several limitations in practice: (1) it works for linear algebra and fast Fourier transform (FFT), but to our knowledge, the question of its applicability to other domains stays open. (2) ABFT was designed for off-line detection and correction. Since
execution in exascale systems is supposed to be hit by several faults before its termination, there is a need for on-line error detection and correction. On-line ABFT (Chen, 2008) consists in stopping the execution of the algorithm at some point before the termination, detecting and potentially correcting errors on the data sets. A recent paper demonstrates that the consistence conservation property is not respected during the computation for several matrix products algorithms. As a consequence these algorithms cannot be used for on-line ABFT. (3) To detect errors on the data sets, ABFT needs global reduction operations. Error correction requires solving a system of linear equations. Reduction and linear system solving involving billions of threads is probably not feasible in an efficient manner. (4) Although some recent work demonstrates that the numerical stability is not harmed in some very specific cases, the general understanding on the impact of ABFT on the numerical stability remains to be investigated. Thus, to understand the applicability of ABFT to future exascale computers and find solutions to its current limitations requires more analysis and research.

5.2.2 Masking Approaches with Rollback Recovery
With the masking approach the faults-errors and failures of the HW and SW are masked to the application (and thus its programmers) and end users. Masking approaches concern three main fault tolerance techniques: Rollback Recovery, Proactive Action and Replication.

As explained previously, most of the work in fault tolerance for HPC is based on Rollback Recovery. Many research projects have been conducted and results published in the past year about automatic checkpoint/restart on remote storage and diskless checkpointing. Despite the fact that these domains have received a lot of attention, several important issues at the exascale remain open.

All checkpoint/restart techniques need to address two main problems: (1) find a scalable fault-tolerant protocol ensuring a consistent cut of the parallel execution in order to built correct, restartable checkpoint images and (2) reduce the computational and/or I/O cost of checkpointing.

Concerning fault tolerant protocols, the progress in the past 10 years is substantial (Elnozahy et al. 2002; Bouteiller et al. 2008). The two classes of protocols (coordinated checkpointing (Chandy and Lamport, 1985) and message logging) were the subjects of strong optimization research. As a consequence, both classes of protocols are very efficient even on high-speed networks and the differences in performance and overhead between them have become less and less significant. Still, we do not know how well these protocols work for one million processes. Moreover, in some sense, the optimal protocol for extreme scale has not been found; such protocol should, in theory, avoid global checkpoint coordination, message logging and the domino effect. A solution could come from a third class of protocols called “communication-induced checkpoint” (CIC). However, previous studies have demonstrated that this kind of protocol could force many more checkpoints than the other classes. Since the cost of checkpointing is supposed to be very high, all previous research has considered that the fewer checkpoints are taken during the execution the better. This raises the question of the checkpoint cost in exascale systems. If the checkpoint cost could be reduced significantly (for example, by redesigning the architecture and using dedicated HW) then CIC protocols may provide a good trade-off.

If fault-tolerance protocols are well understood for MPI environments, there were few studies in the context of PGAS languages and distributed objects on a large scale. What kind of fault tolerant protocols are preferable for these environments? Are there some fundamental differences that preclude the use of some protocols in these environments or make them inefficient?

It has been observed that a large fraction of the checkpointing cost is due to the remote storage of the checkpoint image. In the current “balanced parallel architecture” followed by most of the HPC centers, checkpoint images are stored on a parallel file system through I/O nodes. The bandwidth of the I/O nodes is limited and, according to some measurements and evaluation, the time to store a checkpoint could be as high as 30 minutes. A technique to avoid this bottleneck is to store the checkpoint image on computing nodes. Some redundancy mechanisms are used to ensure that the checkpoints will stay available even if several computing nodes fail. The extreme approach in this domain is diskless checkpointing (Plank et al. 1998; Zheng et al. 2004; Lu, 2005), which essentially stores the checkpoint images in the memory of the computing nodes, still with some form of redundancy to ensure the checkpoint availability in case of failures. Diskless checkpointing has been the object of many research studies. A version of diskless checkpointing supporting a single node failure is
implemented in SCR (SCR, 2009) and has been used since 2007 at LLNL. It has some important drawbacks, such as the doubling of the memory occupation and some need for coordination (when computing the checksums). These two drawbacks could be considered as unacceptable for exascale systems where the memory will be a very expensive resource and where coordination should be avoided as much as possible. However, new technologies, such as SSD devices, seem to offer a new performance and stability trade-off compared to random access memory (RAM) and disks. This is seen by the community as an opportunity to revisit diskless checkpointing studies in the light of these new technologies.

Besides avoiding the bottleneck of remote file systems, another way to reduce the checkpoint time is to reduce the checkpoint size. This topic also has been the object of many researches from various angles: OS-level incremental checkpointing, programmer-directed memory exclusion, compiler-detected dead variables, etc. The two key points exploited by these techniques are: (1) not all data have to be saved to construct a correct checkpoint and (2) data that need to be saved may not be completely updated between two consecutive checkpoints. The researched optimality is the following: between two subsequent checkpoints, save only the updated data that will be read in the future (as parameters of the next operations inside the application or as results of the execution). This supposes an accurate determination of the past updates (from the previous checkpoint) and the future reads. As a matter of fact, none of the existing systems matches this objective. As a consequence, there is certainly a need for further research in this domain.

In addition to increasing the performance in checkpoint/restart, there is a need to ensure the correctness of the data saved and restored for the checkpoint (whether it is a system-wide or an application-based checkpoint). This issue, which is mostly ignored currently, is expected to be significant at the exascale. End-to-end data correctness/integrity is not a novel topic in storage systems. Several standards already exist (e.g. ANSI T10-DIF). However, particularly in the case of checkpoint/restart, every component (HW and SW) from registers to the hard disk needs to conform to give complete confidence. More progress and research are needed in this domain.

5.2.3 Other Masking Approaches (Proactive Actions and Replication) The principle of proactive action is to avoid recovery from faults, errors and failures by predicting them (from notification from sensors, error rates, heuristics, etc.) and proactively replace the suspected components (in theory HW and SW ones) by other correctly working components providing the same function. Two main issues have to be addressed: (1) faults, errors and failure prediction and (2) replacement of suspected components by correct ones. Several researches have been conducted on this domain and results were published in prediction algorithms (Sahoo et al. 2002; Liang et al. 2006; Yaw 2007) and proactive process or virtual machine migration (Chakravorty et al. 2005, 2006; Wang et al. 2008; Scott et al. 2009).

One limitation of the prediction algorithm studies is the number of RAS files considered for the prediction algorithms. Most of these studies considered two log files: one from a cluster of 350 nodes (small compared to our perspective of exascale systems) and the other one from the first 100 days of a BlueGene/L machine. These traces are not representative even of current petascale systems and it is obviously very important to design prediction algorithms based on the most recent traces and a large number of traces. Furthermore, systems currently log only a small subset of the information that can be captured and would be relevant for error prediction. The sheer volume of such data may require on the fly analysis, rather than full capture. We consider efforts in this area as a priority if research on proactive actions is to be continued.

Research on proactive actions has been conducted despite the immaturity of prediction algorithms. This research is useful to understand how the SW could use predictions to avoid recovering from faults, errors and failures. The results are quite encouraging, evaluating the overhead of proactive migration to less than 5% of the execution time, while significantly reducing the occurrence of fatal errors. The first limitation of these studies is that they only consider HW fault-error-failure prediction. In such a context the migration of a process or a virtual machine from a suspected node to a safe one makes sense. However, none of the studies investigate the case of predicted SW faults-errors-failures. This lack is significant, since one can estimate from the available RAS analysis results that SW is responsible for about 50% of the faults-errors-failures. Avoiding recovery for predicted SW faults-errors-failures means being able either to confine their effects or to track the affected SW parts and to be able to replace the suspected SW parts. A frequent misconception is that SW errors are systemic and strongly correlated, so that replacing SW components would mean having a different code implementing each SW component. In fact, many SW errors are intermittent and manifest themselves only in specific, rare execution states (specific memory allocation, specific schedule, etc.); many such errors can be avoided by tinkering with the execution state (Qin et al. 2005). Research on the handling of SW errors is still at an early stage and has not been explored in the context of HPC applications and systems.

More generally, there is a need to better understand the benefit of proactive actions. If these are limited to HW, they would still require some recovery system to tolerate the large amount of unpredicted failures. Even if proac-
tive actions are extended to SW faults-errors-failures, there would still remain a fraction of false negatives (actual faults-errors-failures that will not be predicted), obliging the use of recovery mechanisms. There may be systemic differences between predictable errors and aleatory errors that cannot be predicted reliably. Categorizing errors according to their predictability could lead to much improved error handling. We consider developing the understanding of predictable errors and proactive actions as a main priority.

Replication is another masking approach for fault tolerance. It is the most frequently used resilience technique in all large-scale distributed systems: sensor networks, Grid, Cloud, peer-to-peer (P2P), Desktop Grid, etc. Replication has two main costs: (1) the need to at least double the number of replicated components in the system and (2) the overhead to guarantee the replication consistency and detect errors. Both costs seem unacceptable in the context of HPC systems (except for some very limited cases): CPUs, memory and networks are very expensive and high energy-consuming components; the speed of communication and asynchrony are essential for performance, so matching replicates is difficult, and much of the current state is not externally visible, so errors can be detected long after their occurrence. Thus classic replication may not be feasible for HPC unless a dramatic change in the HW design of HPC machines emerges. Such a breakthrough should not be disregarded, since the past has demonstrated that HW developers can develop radically new approaches, based on new objectives (such as a drastic reduction of the power consumption) and surprise the community. Besides classic replication, there is probably an opportunity to investigate partial replication of only the most critical and fault-errors-failure prone HW components. However, such an approach would require a deep understanding of the faults-errors-failures sources in very large systems, which is by itself still an open question.

5.2.4 Specialized Approaches  The difficulty of designing or improving a “one size fits all” fault-tolerance approach for exascale systems motivates the investigation of dedicated fault tolerance and recovery mechanisms targeting specific failure modes: a kind of divide and conquer approach to fault tolerance. The expected benefit of this approach is that one would trigger the minimal sufficient response when they happen; the ultimate goal being to be able to confine the recovery to only the affected subsystems and avoid as much as possible a global rollback of the execution.

Let us take the example of the transient errors in the L1 cache. Many processors have a write-through L1 and an inclusive L2, so that all L1 values are also present in the L2 cache. As a result, it is sufficient to detect errors in the L1 cache; errors can be corrected by invalidating the L1 cache so that values are reloaded from the L2. Vendors take advantage of this by using a cheaper and faster parity check in the L1, rather than a more expensive ECC.

Such specialized approaches are already used in HPC machines: For example, the network interface often has retransmission mechanisms that are used when transmission errors or uncertain states (e.g. timeouts) are detected; one can trade off the overhead of error correction in the network against the overhead of maintaining a copy of data sent until reception is acknowledged. However, the mechanisms in place cannot correct all errors cases and a posteriori dedicated approaches could be a solution for certain cases.

One problem with the dedicated approach is that it is machine dependent. Another problem is that error detection may occur long after the error occurred; the error is not contained, and it can affect a large portion of the system before it is detected, so that recovery becomes global. If we take the example of a detected but uncorrected transient error in the main memory, affecting a communication receive buffer, then the recovery process would typically involve the sender of the message. Such dependency leads to some coordination between several processes and has a much higher cost than a local corrective technique.

Dedicated techniques rely on the capability to confine faults. The capability to quickly detect an error and to limit its contamination is essential.

As discussed earlier, situational awareness is very important in order to intervene before minor problems treated silently become or lead to very critical ones. Thus, even if dedicated techniques are applied, there is still a need to inform other components about the detected events and how they are being treated. Moreover, if the event is perceived by several detectors and can be corrected in different ways, coordination will be required.

Specialized approaches are undoubtedly appealing for their very low recovery cost, but further investigation is required to clearly understand their limits.

5.2.5 Hardware Support  The four main mechanisms used in rollback recovery are for: (1) detecting failures, (2) storing and restoring the state of a parallel execution, (3) ensuring that the state of the parallel execution is always consistent, despite failures and (4) computing an accurate difference between two successive states. Note that other fault-tolerance approaches need several or all of these mechanisms, in addition to others.

In the current supercomputers very little HW has been designed specifically to help implement fault tolerance. For example, when checkpointing on a remote file system, the process checkpoint images are transmitted by
the communication network, which is used by applications during their execution, and stored on disks used for storing users files. No specific HW is available to implement fault-tolerant protocols. For example, message logging is done in the main memory of the node. Another essential mechanism for fault tolerance (incremental checkpointing) currently relies on OS mechanisms.

However, because the speed of detection, reaction and recovery will be critical in effectively supporting fault tolerance in exascale systems, there is a need to investigate the cost, benefits and limitations of using specific HW for fault tolerance. There are several opportunities for the four mechanisms used in rollback recovery. SSD devices have demonstrated superior performance compared to disks and could be a good alternative for checkpoint image storage and retrieval. A specific network can help to circulate information about the detected faults-errors-failures and their current treatment. A specific reduction network can also be used to speed up the computation of checksums in diskless checkpointing. Another example is the HW support for transactional memory that can be reused to implement efficient incremental checkpointing (Teodorescu et al. 2006).

5.2.6 Software Support SW is suspected to be responsible for a significant fraction, if not the large majority, of the failures in exascale systems. The SW run on large-scale parallel computers is already very complex, but has not been developed with the same rigor of complex HW (such as current microprocessors) with regards to its verification. There is a need to use better development methods to make code more robust (robust journaling capability). There is also a need to more quickly detect and better confine SW errors in order to limit their contamination and make the error correction more local (avoiding global rollback).

5.3 Fault Oblivious Algorithms Having the applications and their algorithms indifferent to fault-errors-failure would be an ultimate goal of the resilience community. As mentioned before, this could only be a long-term effort since not only the application and its algorithms, but also all SW involved in the execution affected by the fault-error-failure should also be fault tolerant (or resilient).

Very little is known in this domain of auto-repairable algorithms, even if some algorithms for distributed systems, such as self-stabilization algorithms (Dijkstra, 1974), can recover themselves from faults. Self-stabilization is a property of an algorithm that allows it to eventually recover from a fault using a forward recovery strategy: instead of being externally stopped and rolled back to a previous correct state, the algorithm continues its execution, impaired by the fault, potentially not respecting its given specifications (giving wrong results), until the algorithm itself corrects the effects of the faults without external influence. Self-stabilization has several limits in the context of HPC applications: (1) self-stabilized algorithms have been studied uniquely in the context of basic distributed system operations (leader election, counting, etc.) and never approached for HPC, (2) the stabilization phase duration is unknown and (3) any fault occurring during the stabilization phase essentially restarts the stabilization. Thus, it is not clear that this approach makes any sense for the numerical algorithms themselves. However, many mechanisms in runtime environments that support parallel computations use distributed system operations that could benefit from this family of algorithms.

It is suspected that iterative methods have some fundamental properties, allowing them to be good starting points for the exploration of fault oblivious algorithms (Liu, 2002; Geist and Engelmann, 2002). Asynchronous iterative methods tolerate delays in the communications of data between processes. Research must be conducted to understand how these methods resist information loss and to what extent they still converge despite a certain level of faults. According to applied mathematicians, these methods have never been directly studied in this context. We see this research as a multidisciplinary one mixing research in mathematics and computer science.

5.4 Stress Testing In addition to progress in applications, systems and HW, there is a need for experimental environments that are able to stress and compare different fault-tolerance approaches and techniques in a scientific way. Large-scale testbeds are essential in the observation and understanding of complex phenomena. SW environments capable of reproducing usage and fault scenarios are also needed to test and debug new resilience concepts on a large scale before putting them into production.

6 Summary This paper argues that resiliency is a critical challenge that cannot be ignored for exascale systems. Incremental improvements of current methods will not be sufficient to meet the failure challenges present in exascale systems, which are anticipated to experience various kinds of faults many times per day. This paper lays out several categories of errors, including silent and transient, that will have to be dealt with at the exascale. It also identifies a range of error sources, including SW issues. The paper goes on to identify four major research topics that need to be explored to enable the exascale. Hence, this white paper synthesizes the motivations, observations and research issues consid-
erased as determinant of several complimentary experts of HPC in applications, programming modeling, distributed systems and systems.

**Author Biographies**

*Franck Cappello* holds a Senior Researcher position at INRIA. He is also Visiting Research Professor at the Department of Computer Sciences of the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. He leads the Grand-Large project at INRIA, focusing on High Performance issues in Large Scale Distributed Systems. He is the co-director of the INRIA-Illinois Joint Laboratory on Petascale Computing. Franck Cappello received a Ph.D. in Computer Science of the University of Paris XI in 1994. He has initiated the XtremWeb (Desktop Grid) and MPICH-V (Fault tolerant MPI) projects. He is the initiator and was the director of the Grid5000 project, a nation wide computer science platform for research in large scale parallel and distributed systems. He has authored papers in the domains of High Performance Programming, Desktop Grids, Grids and Fault tolerant MPI. He has contributed to more than 40 Program Committees. He is editorial board member of the international Journal on Grid Computing, Journal of Grid and Utility Computing and Journal of Cluster Computing. He is a steering committee member of IEEE/ACM HPDC and IEEE/ACM CCGRID.

*Al Geist* is a Corporate Research Fellow at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. He is the Chief Technology Officer of the Leadership Computing Facility and also leads a 35 member Computer Science Research Group. He is one of the original developers of PVM (Parallel Virtual Machine), which became a worldwide de facto standard for heterogeneous distributed computing. He was actively involved in the design of the Message Passing Interface (MPI-1 and MPI-2) standard.

*William Gropp* received his B.S. in Mathematics from Case Western Reserve University in 1977, a MS in Physics from the University of Washington in 1978, and a Ph.D. in Computer Science from Stanford in 1982. He held the positions of assistant (1982–1988) and associate (1988–1990) professor in the Computer Science Department at Yale University. In 1990, he joined the Numerical Analysis group at Argonne, where he was a Senior Computer Scientist in the Mathematics and Computer Science Division, a Senior Scientist in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Chicago, and a Senior Fellow in the Argonne-Chicago Computation Institute. From 2000 through 2006, he was also Deputy Director of the Mathematics and Computer Science Division at Argonne. In 2007, he joined the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign as the Paul and Cynthia Saylor Professor in the Department of Computer Science. His research interests are in parallel computing, software for scientific computing, and numerical methods for partial differential equations. He has played a major role in the development of the MPI message-passing standard. He is co-author of the most widely used implementation of MPI, MPICH, and was involved in the MPI Forum as a chapter author for both MPI-1 and MPI-2. He has written many books and papers on MPI including “Using MPI” and “Using MPI-2”. He is also one of the designers of the PETSc parallel numerical library, and has developed efficient and scalable parallel algorithms for the solution of linear and nonlinear equations. Gropp was named an ACM Fellow in 2006 and received the Sidney Fernbach Award from the IEEE Computer Society in 2008.

*Laxmikant Kale* is a Professor of Computer Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where he has been a faculty member since 1985. He received a Ph.D. in computer science from State University of New York, Stony Brook, in 1985. His research has involved various aspects of parallel computing, with a focus on enhancing performance and productivity via adaptive runtime systems, and designing programming abstractions based on use-cases from multiple applications. He led the development of Charm++ and AMPI programming systems that embody an adaptive runtime system. He has collaboratively developed well-known parallel applications in areas including biophysics, astronomy and quantum chemistry. He was co-recipient of a Gordon Bell award in 2002.

*William Kramer* is deputy project director at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications William T.C. Kramer is deputy project director at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications; he is responsible for leading the Blue Waters project, a National Science Foundation-funded project, to deploy the first general purpose, open science, sustained-petaflop supercomputer as a powerful resource for the nation’s researchers. Blue Waters is a 8 year project with an overall cost of over $500M. Previously Kramer was the general manager of the National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center (NERSC), the flagship computing facility of the Department of Energy’s Office of Science at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). Prior to Berkeley Lab, Kramer worked at the NASA Ames Research Center, where he was responsible for all aspects of operations and customer service for NASA’s Numerical Aerodynamic Simulator (NAS) supercomputer center and other large computational projects. Blue Waters will be the 20th supercomputer Kramer deploys and manages. Several were first of their kind, including the world’s first UNIX supercomputer and the first production quality massively parallel system. In addition he deployed and
managed large clusters of workstations, several extremely large data repositories, some of the world’s most intense networks, and other extreme scale systems. He has also been involved with the design, creation and commissioning of six “best of class” HPC facilities. He holds a BS and MS in computer science from Purdue University, an ME in electrical engineering from the University of Delaware, a PhD in computer science at UC Berkeley and a number of professional certifications. Kramer’s research interests include large-scale system performance evaluation, systems management, scheduling, fault detection and resiliency, and cyber security. He has taught classes, seminars, and tutorials on computing topics, including cluster computing, computer security, computer graphics and visualization, data intensive computing and high performance computing. Kramer has awards from NASA, the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) and was named one of HPCWire’s “People to Watch in 2005”.

Marc Snir is Michael Faiman and Saburo Muroga Professor in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and has a courtesy appointment in the Graduate School of Library and Information Science. He currently pursues research in parallel computing. He is PI for the software of the petascale Blue Waters system and co-director of the Intel and Microsoft funded Universal Parallel Computing Research Center (UPCRC). He was head of the Computer Science Department from 2001 to 2007. Until 2001 he was a senior manager at the IBM T. J. Watson Research Center where he led the Scalable Parallel Systems research group that was responsible for major contributions to the IBM SP scalable parallel system and to the IBM Blue Gene system. Marc Snir received a Ph.D. in Mathematics from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1979, worked at NYU on the NYU Ultracomputer project in 1980–1982, and was at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1982–1986, before joining IBM. Marc Snir was a major contributor to the design of the Message Passing Interface. He has published numerous papers and given many presentations on computational complexity, parallel algorithms, parallel architectures, interconnection networks, parallel languages and libraries and parallel programming environments. Marc is AAAS Fellow, ACM Fellow, and IEEE Fellow. He has Erdos number 2 and is a mathematical descendent of Jacques Hadamard.

Notes
1 By definition a failure is the impact of an error itself caused by a fault.
2 Situation awareness (SA) is a term used by the Human Factors community to indicate “the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future,” (EN, 1995). Another definition is knowing what is happening and what has happened so a person can take the correct action.

References


